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COMMENTS REGARDING RESPONDENT'S
"STATEMENT OF CASE"
The mother
several

has set forth

"facts" which

Court.

are

in her

inappropriate

"Statement

of Case"

to present

to this

The Rules of this Court require that the facts from the

record be set forth with appropriate citations to the record.
Rule 24 (a) (7) , (b) , (c) , R. Utah Ct. App.
The
rendered

father

appealed

a decision

District

Judge

Young

as a matter of law: that a husband may not, regardless

of his claims, be awarded an injunction preventing his wife from
aborting

their

common

child.

Relief, dated May 31, 1988.

See Order

Denying

Injunctive

Since the ruling was as a matter

of law, the unresolved factual claims of the two sides have
little or no relevance.
The important facts are agreed upon (see complaint and
answer; R. 2-7, 14-22):
1.

The parties are married (seeking a divorce).

2.

The parties are parents of one young child.

3.

The parties conceived a second time.

4.

The mother desired to abort this second child, since

she is young and did not feel ready for a second baby.
5.

The father desired to raise both children.

Nevertheless, the mother has throughout her brief and
particulary in her "Statement of the Case" recited in a way most

VI.

favorable to herself
been the facts.

(as respondent), what she believes to have

In many instances she has set forth "facts"

without citation to the record/ often knowing they were clearly
in dispute.

At no time has an evidenciary hearing been held in

this matter and no Findings of Fact have been made, since the
ruling below was as a matter of law.
For
anything

example,

that

plaintiff,

the

mother

asserts

it was "not until

as

a

result

of

his

after

without

citation

the defendant

extramarital

plaintiff objected to the scheduled abortion."

to

left the

affairs,
Brief p. 2.

that
The

mother is acutely aware that these facts were not presented to
the court for decision, are denied by the father and are hotly
disputed between the parties.
to make

such an assertion

It is worse than

in a brief

for

inappropriate

this Court

to rely

upon, as if it were factual.
The mother

also uses considerable

space explaining her

assertions in the divorce proceedings which are still pending in
the

court

assertions

below.
are

See, e.g.,
also

Brief

irrelevant,

pp. 4-6.

since

the

These
case

factual

has

been

certified for appeal and bifurcated, and the divorce issues have
nothing to do with whether a father has a right to be heard with
regard to the termination of the unborn he has sired.
Pages five and six of the mother's brief recite what she
apparently

claims

to

be

a

procedural

history

of

the

case.

However, those pages contain no citations to the record and are

vii.

likewise irrelevant to the issues on appeal.
the

Court's

example,

time,

the

these

mother

discussions

claims

(Brief

are

Besides wasting

misleading.

pp. 5-6)

that

For

plaintiff

"objected to the Commissioner's recommendation that he pay his
share of the child custody evaluation".

If the mother has

studied the file or recalls the proceeding she is aware that the
objection was only to the commissioner's order that the father
pay the entire cost of the evaluation.

This objection succeeded

in causing Judge Young to order the mother to pay her third.
See, Order on Order to Show Cause, exhibit G to Respondent's Brief.
It is particulary inappropriate for the mother to allege
(Brief pp. 6-7; 26-28) that the father has been "consistently
late" in paying his support since entry of the judgment, etc.
The details involved which are in dispute, are again irrelevant
to this appeal, and are not a part of the record.
The

father

feels

that

such

abuse

of

the

facts and

misleading of the Court are wholly inappropriate, and therefore
moves to strike the Brief of respondent, or at least pages 3
through 7 and 26 through 28 thereof, together with Exhibits G
and B.

viii.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The mother's brief may be disregarded in whole or in part,
since it is grounded upon an improper use of facts outside the
record, misstates facts and fails to cite to the record.
It is the mother, not the father, who seeks an exclusive,
nonreviewable veto power over her mate in the abortion decision.
The rights of the parties are both private or both involve state
action, making balancing appropriate.

ARGUMENT

I.

The mother's brief should be disregarded.
As pointed out in the foregoing comments, the mother's

response brief

contains factual

inaccuracies, recites "facts"

which are not in the record, and fails to cite to the record.
Rule 24(a)(7) and (b) requires stated facts to
citations to the record.

And the facts used must be "relevant to

the issues presented for review."
(b).

be supported by

R. Utah Ct. App. 24(a)(7) and

See also R. Utah Ct. App. 24(e).
Many

of

the

disputed, actually do

facts

used

by

the mother

which, though

appear in the trial court's file are from

documents submitted and proceedings held after the matter was
certified for appeal, bifurcated and appealed.
The record in a case where there is not a transcript
consists of documents "filed in the court from which the appeal
- 1 -

is taken."
could

not

R. Utah Ct. App. 11(a).
include

documents

and

The father believes this

proceedings

in the divorce

portion of the case occurring in the trial court after this Court
had taken jurisdiction over the abortion issues.

The advisory

committee, in drafting the comparable rule for the Utah Supreme
Court, noted that the court may rely on any material contained in
the "district court's original file."

Adv. Comm. Note to Rule

11(a), R. Utah S. Ct. (emphasis supplied).
The Supreme Court's notes for Rule 24(a)(7) point out that
the prior rule had a similar requirement for use of the record,
but the new rule was for emphasis, as the old one was often
disregarded.

Adv. Comm. Note to Rule 24(a)(7), R. Utah S. Ct.

Briefs may not contain burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial
or scandalous matters.
brief

R. Utah Ct. App. 24 (k).

The response

appears to violate this restriction, since it contains

several pages of inaccurate, irrelevant and somewhat inflamatory
factual narrative.

Briefs not in compliance with Rule 24 may be

disregarded or stricken on motion or sua sponte, and the court
may assess attorney fees against the offending draftsman.

Id.;

see also R. Utah Ct. App. 40(b) [sanction for failure to comply
with rules].

The father requests such action under that rule as

the Court deems appropriate.
The Court
attorney

recently warned

fees or disregarding

that Rule 24!s penalties of

or striking

a brief

are real.

Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 961, 962, 82 Utah Adv.
- 2 -

Rep. 26, 27 (Utah App. 1988); Dirks v. Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946,
947, 948, 81 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah App. 1988).
The courts have often lamented the use of facts alleged
but not supported by the record on appeal, and will not consider
irrelevant material.

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986);

State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1983), cert. den. 460
U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443; 75 L.Ed.2d 799 (1983).

"Appellant

makes many immaterial factual allegations that are not supported
by the record and has failed to cite those portions of the record
that do support the material facts. . . . This Court need not,
and will not, consider

any facts not properly

supported by the record."

cited

to, or

Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life

Ins., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).

II.

The mother continues to confuse the issue.
It appears to the father that the two briefs filed to date

are to a large extent arguing opposite sides of different issues.
The father asks that his rights in his procreation be recognized,
and defined, and, when properly and speedily asserted, balanced
against the mother's desire to terminate the procreative right
for both parents.

The mother continues to argue against a veto

power by the father over his wife's choice.

See, e.g., Resp.

Brief Points I, II and V; Summary of Arguments, Brief pp. 7-10,
13, etc.

- 3 -

For

example, both

parties

have

Schroering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1978).
Brief p. 12-13.

referred

to Wolfe

v.

App. Brief p. 3; Resp.

The mother seems to use Wolfe, like most of her

other authorities, to show that somehow the father's balancing of
rights suggestion is prohibited by the Supreme Court's rejection
of a spousal veto.

Resp. Brief p. 12-13.

The mother makes the

same mistake with Judge Ritter's decision in Doe v. Rampton, 366
F.Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), App. Brief p. 14.
In deciding this case, the father suggests that the Court
ignore all arguments as to why husbands should not be allowed an
absolute, nonreviewable control of their mate's abortion options.
It is the mother, not the father, who seeks an absolute veto—the
right

to decide whether

the

fetus develops

or

dies—without

being inconvenienced by input from the husband-father.

III.

Danforth does not control this case.
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,

96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 797 (1975), discussed in the father's
prior brief, does not determine the outcome in this case as the
mother believes.

In fact, to hold that under no circumstances

may the husband enjoin abortion of his unborn child would be to
extend Danforth beyond its limits. Danforth condemned absolutes.
Such an effectively absolute wife veto of the husband's voice
would actually be contrary to the spirit of Danforth.

- 4 -

The Supreme Court has itself stressed the limited coverage
of Danforth.

"In Danforth we struck down state statutes that

imposed a requirement of prior written consent of the patient's
spouse and of a minor patient's parents as a prerequisite to an
abortion."

H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408, 101 S.Ct. 1164,

1170, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981).
In Matheson a minor sought to overturn the Utah statute
requiring

abortionists

to notify,

if possible, parents

minor before performing her requested abortion.

of the

§ 76-7-304, Utah

Code Anno. (1974).

The mandate comes from a phrase in the same

statutory

sentence

that

possible,

the

spouse

requires
if

the

the

woman

physician
is

to notify,

married.

notification, the only provision at issue, was upheld.
at 1173.
which

if

Parental
450 U.S.

Relying on Danforth and other abortion decisions upon

the mother

here

relies, the Utah Supreme Court had also

upheld the statute, affirming Judge Winder.

H.L. v. Matheson,

604 P.2d 907 (1979) .
The Matheson minor alleged that her right to privacy would
be violated by having to notify her parents, also attempting to
rely

on

Danforth

Danforth.

But

held merely

that

the

Supreme

a state may

Court

pointed

not give

possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision . . .

out

that

"an absolute,

to terminate the

patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the
consent."

450 U.S. at 408 quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.

- 5 -

The court noted that the Bellotti decisions also dealt
with absolutes.

450 U.S. at 408, 409, citing Bellotti v. Baird,

428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976) (Bellotti I);
and

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d

797 (1979) (Bellotti II)[where four justices felt the defect in
statute was

absolute veto, failing

to allow

judicial deter-

mination that particular minor is mature and should not have to
notify parents].
But the Matheson provision was acceptable, since "It]he
Utah statute gives neither parents nor judges a veto power over
the minor's abortion decision."

450 U.S. at 411.

So Danforth

and its progeny hold only that as between a blanket veto by the
father

(or parent), and the woman's right to abort, the latter

prevails.
Not only does Danforth deal with absolute veto, it also
adjudicates the rights of a mere husband, who may or may not be
the father.
reserved

The opinion noted, "In Roe and Doe we specifically

decision

on the question whether

a requirement for

consent by the father of the fetus, by the spouse, or by the
parents, or a parent, of an unmarried minor, may be constitutionally

imposed."

405 U.S. at 69.

Of these questions,

Danforth decided only one: may the state delegate to all spouses
an absolute veto in every case.

The Matheson case later decided

parental

acceptable

notification

was

an

disallowing a blanket veto.
- 6 -

requirement,

again

And
490-493

in

Planned

Parenthood

v.

Ashcroft,

462

U.S. 476,

(1983) a requirement of parental or judicial consent was

upheld for unmarried minors.

The structure was acceptable since

parents have power over their minor children.

The statute did

not "give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto
.

. . regardless

of the

reason

for withholding

the

consent,"

since a court could waive the lack of consent on a case by case
basis.

Id. at 643.

Without saying so, this seems to approve a

balancing of sorts of parents1 and minor child's interests.
case

presents

an

opportunity

to

determine

the

issue

This
of

a

balancing of parental versus personal interests.
The father's rights here are perhaps more compelling than
a parent's right to give or withhold consent to abortion (subject
to a court waving consent in a given case).
permanent

extinguishment

of

his

He seeks to prevent

constitutional

rights,

rather

than to merely influence a minor child's decision.
Danforth is not controlling, since the invalidation of the
Missouri

spousal consent law was based on the premise that the

state could not delegate that which it did not have.
69.

Danforth at

The interests of a father in his children do not derive from

the state.

If they did the state could arbitrarily curtail those

rights, something the state is not permitted to do.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1972).

Santoskey v.

(1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645

The line of United States Supreme Court abortion cases

- 7 -

all involve state statutes.
The mother has argued that distinguishing the father's
balancing

suggestion

from an absolute veto is "a distinction

without a difference."

Brief p. 11. This is true, she contends,

because the balance may result in overcoming her will, and "a
veto is a veto."
father

may win

Id.

This is analogous to saying that because a

custody

at trial, allowing

him the trial is

tantamount to robbing her of the right to her children, since the
outcome could be the same.

The Matheson dissent took a similar

stance, equating notice with allowing a veto (Marshall, joined by
Blackmun and Brennan) .

The majority rejected the attempt.

450

U.S. at 411 n. 17.
Neither

Danforth

nor

Matheson, nor

any other decision

controlling this Court, has considered the father's rights under
the circumstances of this case.

IV.

The father's rights are as "private" as the mother's.
By reasoning which defies logic, the mother has asserted

that her right to abort is purely "private" while his rights as a
father are "state action."
convenient for the mother.

This inaccurate catagorization is
Casting the father's right to see his

child born as state action lets pro-choice decisions apply the
constitutional right to privacy.

And if the mother

can hide her

desire to abort behind the "private rights" label, the Court may
ignore the fundamental

rights of the father to procreate and
- 8 -

raise children.

Brief p. 15-16.

The mother has made the distinction based upon the fact
that the father here resorted to the trial court to weigh the
Of course the parties1 rights were first

respective rights.

asserted in private discussions.

But whenever someone's exercise

of private rights is infringed upon, his or her options are to
give in, use self help or resort to the courts.
impasse arose, the mother

Here when an

attempted self help by planning an

abortion, and the father went to court.

Had he resorted to self

help to prevent the abortion, the mother would have been the one
in court seeking an injunction.
The

father

believes both parents1

rights are private,

regardless of who wins the race to the courthouse or, who has the
physical ability to subordinate her spouse's will to her own.

V.

No state action is involved.
Even the pro-choice dissent by Justice Marshall stated

that the abortion right must be free of unwarranted state action.
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 1170, 67
L.Ed.2d 388 (1981), Marshall, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan,
J. and Blackmun, J.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter

alia:
No State shall make or
abridge the privileges
the United States; no
person of life, liberty

enforce any law which shall
or immunities of citizens of
shall any State deprive any
, or property, without due

- 9 -

process of law; nor deny to any persons within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
Clearly

there

involved.

can

be

no

violation

unless

state

action

is

Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol 1 § 8:1.

All

the Supreme Court cases cited by the mother are attacks on state
statutes, where

state

action

is unquestioned.

They

do not

apply to this case.
State action does not necessarily exist simply because the
courts are resorted to for enforcement of private rights.
e.g.,
628.

See,

Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 24 L.Ed.2d 634, 90 S.Ct.
State action in fathers1 rights cases usually is found when

the rights are defined by statute.

Swayne v. L.D.S. Social

Services, 91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah App. Sept. 15, 1988).
In the case of Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Advocates
rights

for Life, Inc., abortion advocates brought a civil

action

against

abortion

opponents, claiming

they

had

disrupted their abortion business, and intimidated and harassed
patients.

681 F.Supp. 688 (D.Or. 1988).

The court found that to

be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), plaintiffs would need to
prove violation of their right to privacy (abortion rights) under
the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, as defined by Roe v.
Wade and its progeny.

681 F.Supp. at 691. The court stated:

This right to personal privacy is founded upon the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and its restrictions upon state action. . . . The
recognition of a constitutional right to privacy
guarantees to women the right to make certain
- 10 -

fundamental intimate choices without governmental
interference. . . . It does notf however, protect
that right from private interference. . • .
Id. (citations only omitted, emphasis supplied).

In that case no

state action was found, since the actions of defendants were
private, and not dependent upon a state statute.
A similar case was Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Butte Glenn Medical Society, 557 F.Supp. 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
Chico, an abortion clinic, brought a claim against the only local
hospital and others under the same civil rights statute as was
used in Portland.
of

defendants

Part of the claim was that since the actions

made

performing

abortions

more

difficult

expensive there was a right to privacy infringement.

and

The court

held that state action must be shown, not merely interference by
a private party.

Where the only facts showing state action were

the hospital's receipt of state funds and its local monopoly, no
state action was found.

557 F.Supp. at 1197.

Danforth (428 U.S. at 69) held that since the state cannot
proscribe abortion, it cannot delegate the authority to do so to
any particular person, even the spouse.

But by the Court simply

recognizing that the husband has, independent of the state, an
interest of his own in the life of the fetus which should not be
extinguished by the unilateral decision of his wife, the state
delegates nothing.
It by no means follows, from the fact that the
mother's interest in deciding 'whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy' outweighs the State's
interest in the potential life of the fetus, that
- 11 -

the husband's interest is also outweighed and may
not be protected by the State. A father's interest
in having a child . . . may be unmatched by any
other interest in his life.
Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 960
dissenting,

cert.

den.

(Ind. 1988), Pivarnik, J.

109

S.Ct.

391

(1988).

The whole concept of the Supreme Court's abortion
cases is one of "zones of privacy" into which the
state may not enter.
See, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153, 35 L Ed 2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727 (1973);.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 756, 35
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). It is simplistic to a fault to
assume the father of the unborn child (who is also
husband) stands in the same position as the state,
in the life or death decision.
In each [abortion] case the right of privacy was but
the correlative of the duty of the State to refrain
from activity to which, by virtue of the limited
nature of our constitutional government, it was
obliged to remain a stranger. But who will assert
that the husband here is, or could ever be, a
stranger to the destruction of the fetus which he
begot or the possible future birth of his child. . .
. [A] father's rights in the birth of a child cannot
be dissolved unreasoned reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d
dissenting.

128, 136

(Mass. 1974).

Reardon, J.

It is not unusual for a court to enforce private

rights which are denied to the state.

See, Moose Lodge No. 107

v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972).

VI.

Plaintiff's fundamental rights are threatened.
The mother coldly states, "it is up to the plaintiff, not

the courts, to find someone willing to bear plaintiff's child."
Brief p. 17.
born.

Of course the father's child here will never be

Another opportunity to procreate could

arise, but never

as to the child destroyed by the mother's actions.
- 12 -

The father has not sought help from the courts or anyone
else

to

"find

someone

to bear

his offspring."

The mother

consensually committed the acts necessary to conceive this child.
See, C.S. v. Nielson, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah App. Dec. 6,
1988) ["Clearly [a] person's decision not to conceive a child and
to undergo surgical sterilization should not be confused with
one's decision to abort a child already conceived."] (emphasis in
original, citation omitted).

The impassioned arguments she has

made concerning forced contraception, compelling a woman to do
the

acts

necessary

disregarded.

to

become

pregnant,

etc.,

should

be

See, e.g. Brief pp. 17-18, 25-26.

Despite what the mother argues, a father's fundamental
rights in his children are directly

involved in the abortion

dispute.

128, 133

Doe

v.

Doe,

Hennessey, J. dissenting.

314

N.E.2d

(Mass.

1974).

The father cited several pages of Utah

and United States Supreme Court cases on a father's rights in his
opening brief, and they will not be repeated here.

As in Doe, "a

substantial, indeed precious interest of the husband has been
extinguished."

Id. at 135, Reardon, J. dissenting.

Justice

Henessey summarized his feelings about the case, which illustrate
its similarity to this one:
The father's rights asserted here are surely
among the fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution.
In the circumstances of the case before us, the
father's rights were dominant. The woman's health
was not a factor.
She had separated from her
husband and did not want the child because she
doubted her ability to care for the child and
- 13 -

because she said her husband had indicated to her
that he would not support it.
The husband wanted
the pregnancy to continue to full term and a normal
birth.
He stated he would be willing
to assume
custody, and care for the child, in the event that
the wife would not. The wife's assertions were not
supportable by contrast with those of her husband.
Thus, justice to her husband, at the very least,
required forbearance by the wife.
Id. at 134.
The Doe majority, whose ruling is not controlling in Utah,
felt obliged to rule in favor of a mother's unfettered right to
abortion.

The

father

believes

this Court

would

do better

part,

the

to

follow the better reasoned dissents.
The
expressed

problem

for

in her brief

the

mother

that

is,

in

attitude

she considers the father a "third

party" who should not interfere.

Brief p. 11, 11 2.

Hopefully no

court would take such an attitude.
The father's
overcome

them

rights are fundamental, and any attempt to

is viewed by the courts with

"strict

scrutiny."

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62
S.Ct.

1110,

86

L.Ed.2d

1655

(1942).

It would

be

absurd

to

suggest this interest springs into existence, fully bloomed, on
the day of birth.

As for the mother, the gestation period

is

for the father a time of anxiety, anticipation, and increase in
feeling for the unborn child.
Child Care, pp. 28031

See, generally, Spock, Baby and

(Revised Pocket Book ed. 1968);

Poe v.

Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (1975); Jones v. Smith, 474 F.Supp. 1160,
1168 (1979).
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A Florida husband consent statute was rejected because
(like Danforth) it allowed withholding of consent "for any reason
or no reason at all."

Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F.Supp. 695, 698

(S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 517 F.2d 787. cert, den., 417 U.S. 279,
afffd

(as to denial of injunctive relief), 417 U.S. 281 (1974).

But the court wrote that interests (like fathers1) which arise at
the moment of conception, and are outside the categories of
protection of maternal health and potential life, would not be
controlled by Roe v. Wade and its progeny, and would withstand
constitutional attack.

376 F.Supp. at 697-698.

We recognize that the interest of the husband in
the embryo or fetus carried by his wife, especially
if he is the father, is qualitatively different from
the interest which the mother may have in her health
and the interest of the viable fetus in its
potential life. The interest which a husband has in
seeing his procreation carried full term is,
perhaps, at least equal to that of the mother. The
biological bifurcation of the sexes, which dictates
that the female alone carry the procreation of the
two sexes, should not necessarily foreclose the
active participation of the male in decisions
relating to whether their mutual creation should be
aborted or allowed to prosper. It may be that the
husband's interest in this mutual procreation
attaches at the moment of conception.
VII.

The balancing approach is less restrictive than a veto.
It appears there are a couple of concepts upon which both

parties to this action can agree:
1.
2.

Under Danforth an absolute veto is not allowed.
The

father

has

rights

in

his

offspring

and to

procreate, though the effect of those rights on this case are
disputed.
- 15 -

The balancing approach suggested by the father addresses
these two problems, allowing involvement and a possibility of
winning an injunction preserving the unborn child, while falling
short of the absolute veto.
The court in Jones v. Smith, 474 F.Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla.
1979) was faced with a Florida statute requiring notification and
consultation
performed.

with

the

husband

before

an

abortion

could

be

The court upheld the statute, noting that Danforth

would not apply, since something less than a veto power was given
to the husband.

474 F.Supp. at 1167. Like Danforth (428 U.S. at

69), Jones recognized the deep and proper concern and interest a
devoted husband or father might have.

474 F.Supp. at 1168.

And

Jones agreed with Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (1975) that the
state has an interest in protecting the rights of a pregnant
woman's husband.

474 F.Supp. at 1168.

Jones found the statute was an appropriate promotion of
the

state's

interest

in protecting

the husband's

rights and

fostering the marital relationship, without the constitutional
infirmity that exists when the husband is given an absolute veto.
Id.
Where a court is faced with a less restrictive attempt to
protect a father's rights, as here, it may recognize the rights
asserted.
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VIII.

The balancing approach is not unworkable.
The mother's arguments against the balancing approach are

for the most part more examples of inappropriate and misleading
use of facts not in the record/ devoid of attempts to cite to
the record.

See, e.g. Brief pp. 27-28.

And it approaches

scandalous for the mother to state that his desire to enjoin the
abortion

"was more

defendant

than

fatherhood."
assumption?

likely

his wish

based

on

to take

Brief pp. 27-28.

his wish

on the

to harass the

responsibilities of

On what can she base such an

It is not only inappropriate—it is belied by these

proceedings.
The mother
weighed

the

makes

the point

interest, she believes

anyway. Brief p. 28.

that had

the court below

she would

have prevailed

This is an argument for, rather than

against, a balancing approach.
The mother states that if the trial court had ruled in
favor

of the father, she would be faced with the "difficult

decision

of placing

for

adoption the child

she has born or

rearing the child with insufficient resources."
Such a comment, apparantly

Brief p. 28.

presuming automatic custody in the

mother, illustrates the gender bias on which the mother's claim
rests.

How can she assume the decision would be hers?

How can

she assume care of the child would be awarded to the mother that
wished it not to be born?
The argument (Brief pp. 27-28) that the judicial reduction
of support (due to the father's loss of employment) or alleged
late payments illustrate why he should not prevail are likewise

flawed with bigotry.

To base a father's rights on financial

ability has never been appropriate, and would surely be met with
a lawsuit by the mother's supporters if such criteria were used
by

a court

or

statute to terminate parental

rights or deny

custody.

IX.

A balancing approach can be effective.
From its inception the abortion right has been regarded

not as absolute, but as an interest to be weighed and balanced
against other important interests.

For example, after finding

abortion within the right of privacy, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the
Roe v. Wade court wrote:
[Slome argue that the woman's right is absolute and
that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at
whatsoever time, in whatever way, and for whatever
reason she alone chooses.
With this we do not
agree. . . . In fact, it is not clear to us that the
claim asserted by some . . . that one has an
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy
previously articulated in the Court's decisions.
The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited
right of this kind in the past.
We therefore conclude that the right of personal
privacy includes the abortion decision, but that
this right is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests. . . .
The same day the Supreme Court struck down Danforth's
husband veto statute, it refused to invalidate on its face a
statute that provided for a judicial balancing of the facts and
circumstances

in which a minor desires to obtain an abortion

without parental consent.

Rather, it directed the lower court to
- 18 -

get more information about whether the judicial proceedings would
protect

the minor's

rights.

Bellotti

v. Baird,

428 U.S. 132

(Bellotti I) (1976).
Bellotti
consent

was

obtain

I observed

that

a statute

preferring

acceptable, so long as the minor

an order

permitting

the

could

abortion without

parental

reasonably

consent

where

she shows herself capable of giving informed consent, and that to
do so

without parental permission would be in her best interest.

428 U.S. at 145.

Accord,

Bellotti v. Baird

(Bellotti II), 443

U.S. 622 (1979) [grounded in an individual judicial determination
on a case by case basis].
In

the

case

of

identical to this case.
(1988) .

Justice

Doe

v.

Smith

the

facts

were

almost

Certiorari was denied at 108 S.Ct. 2136

Stevens

seemed

to note

that

one

reason

for

denial was that the balancing had already been performed by the
Indiana trial court, which had found in favor of the mother.
108 S.Ct.

at 2137.

See

Justice Stevens did not state whether the

trial court was in error in performing such a balancing.
Issues which might be considered in a balancing approach
were used in the lower court in Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961
(Ind. 1988), Pivarnik, J. dissenting, cert. den. 109 S.Ct. 391
(1988) .

Those included the effect on the spouses of a ruling one

way or the other, circumstances of the parties, specifics of the
pregnancy,

opinions of doctors, etc.
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The

balancing

approach

fits

naturally

into

a

divorce

action, as this one was.
This case arises from the attempt of a trial judge
to make a decision involving one of the issues
presented in a dissolution case in which he had full
jurisdiction over all issues arising from and
involved in the marriage relationship of these two
people. It falls on him to hear the facts and apply
the law to make a distribution of the parties1
property and to provide for the care, custody and
support of the minor children.
In so doing he can
place the custody of the child with either party. .
. . A finding that the wife conceives, even in the
first trimester, fixes a responsibility on the
husband to care for that child. . . . It is incomprehensible to me that this same trial court is
foreclosed from even considering the question of
whether the wife should be permitted to destroy this
creation of both parties in the marital relationship
merely because she wants to. At least up to now, no
right has been determined to be absolute.
Every
right must yield and respond to rights of others.
526 N.E.2d at 962, Pivarnik, J. dissenting.
Neither the father's interest in bringing the pregnancy to
term nor that of the mother in terminating it has been declared
to be absolute and cancel out the other.

"The balance of these

two rights, each of such a sensitive nature and personal nature,
is, as I see it, the real task confronting the court."
Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 138
Justice Reardon pointed

Doe v.

(Mass. 1974), Reardon, J. dissenting.
out

that the mother's interests, while

significant, were largely temporary.
The mother opposes a balancing test, because she seeks an
absolute right.
It is one thing to emancipate women from discrimination and male tyranny; it is quite another to
emancipate
them
from
all
human
claims
and
obligations toward the rights of others. But to
- 20 -

claim or presume an absolute right to abortion or to
make 'women's rights' absolute is to create a set of
rights for women subject to none of the normal
limitations of life in human community.
Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality, 464 (1970).
authority gives her such an absolute right.

No

And no one stands in

a better position to test the limits of the abortion right in a
fair hearing than the father and husband.

If he had no rights

that can, under any circumstances, outweigh those of his wife,
abortion on demand would be absolute after all.

It is not. See,

e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d
388 (1981).

X.

Roe v. Wade should be narrowed.
The mother is concerned that authority has been used to

indicate that Roe v. Wade may be overturned soon.

While this is

the case, and the father's hope, it is not necessary for him
to

ask

that

any

controlling

case

be

reversed.

As

indicated above, the limits of the abortion right are not fully
defined.

The authority cited in the father's opening brief to

indicate Roe's strength is waning illustrates that its bounds
are being (and should be) restricted, not expanded.
The days of knee-jerk negative reactions to even the least
restriction on the abortion right are long gone.

The Court could

as easily point find the father's rights consistent with Roe v.
Wade, Danforth and other cases, as to overturn them.
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XI.

Pees should be awarded to the father, not the mother.
The mother has asked that she be awarded her attorney fees

on appeal

against the father, Brief p. 30, again based upon

facts not in the record.
need.

The apparent basis for her request is

That is not a criterion for attorney fees on appeal under

R. Utah Ct. App. 33.

The Court may award costs and attorney's

fees to the prevailing party if it finds the appeal frivolous or
brought for delay.

Eames v. Eames, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50

(Utah App. 1987) [where evidence was mischaracterized].
Even if capacity to pay were considered to determine the
attorney fee issue, the mother would not be entitled to an award
in this case.

She points out that both parties have low income.

Brief p. 30. But she fails to mention that her counsel is acting
as "Attorneys for defendant
Union."
to

and the American Civil Liberties

Resp. Brief Ex. D p. 6.

request

reimbursement

of

It is disturbing for the mother
fees

(based

on

need)

without

disclosing whether she is responsible for or paying those fees,
and the extent to which she is assisted

by the ACLU.

The

father's support has consisted of $1,000 received from National
Right to Life, hardly enough to cover out of pocket costs.
Either fees should be born by each party, or the mother
should be required to pay the father's.
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CONCLUSION
It

is

remand

would

fetus,

even

impossible
profit
though

to

restore

little.
the

the

father's

rights, so a

aborted

the parties1

The mother

father's

counsel

had declared

in open

court his intention to go immediately to this Court for a similar
order.

Apparently she believed she had done so during the narrow

window of opportunity between Judge Young's oral dissolution of
the

temporary

restraining

order

and

Presiding

Judge

Garff's

ruling, less than an hour later, again restraining the abortion.
Actually the abortion occurred after the order was entered, but
allegedly without notice of the order.
Since the child is gone the father merely seeks an order
declaring

that the trial court was in error not to balance the

private rights and interests of the parties to determine whether
to issue a permanent injunction against aborting the child.
The father requests a recognition that he has rights, and
that the mother's rights are not limitless.

Such a holding would

he entirely consistent with Roe v. Wade, Danforth and all other
decisions of controlling jurisdictions.
To hold for the mother would further a sex bias, as stated
in the father's opening brief.
Finally, the Court should strike or disregard the mother's
brief, and award attorney fees to the father as a consequence of
the misuse of facts.
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Respectfully

so

requested

this

twenty-fourth

day

of

February, 1989.

Mitchell R. Barker
Evan R. Hurst
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the twenty-fourth day of February,
1989, I caused four copies of the foregoing to be hand delivered
or mailed, postage prepaid, to:

David S. Dolowitz, Esq,
Michael S. Evans, Esq.
Julie A. Bryan, Esq.
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
and for American Civil Liberties Union

Mitchell R. Barker
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EXHIBIT

ORDER

DENYING

"A"

INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF

\\ I y\>

Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Evan R. Hurst, # 5091
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801)486-9636
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS,
ORDER DENYING INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No.

D-88-944

JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS,
Judge David S. Young
Defendant.

On March 30, 1988, the above Court, with the Honorable
David S. Young presiding, based upon an Order to Show Cause
previously issued, heard the request of plaintiff that the Order
temporarily restraining defendant from having an abortion be
made

a

permanent

injunction.

Plaintiff

appeared

and

was

represented by Mitchell R. Barker and Evan R. Hurst. Defendant,
by leave of the Court, did not appear but was represented by
Michael S. Evans of the Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake City.
David S. Dolowitz, also appeared, appearing on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union and defendant.

Argument was

heard, and the Court being fully advised, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Temporary Restraining Order previously
issued

be

immediately

dissolved

injunction issue.
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and

that

no

permanent

,^.v

0 >

y;,v,

;>">

BY THE DISTRICT COURT:

By
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